

NON-FUNCTIONALITY OF THE CONDITIONALY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU: ANALYSIS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TURKEY- EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS AFTER JULY 15 JULY

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ABSTRACT

Having a unique structure, the European Union has an interesting approach to its relations with third countries. The EU, which holds the right to say the final word in relation to the third countries, has its own right to appreciate, and it decides itself how such states will continue their relations. On the other hand, the EU wants to fulfill some obligations from third countries in order for relations to be better. When these obligations are not fulfilled by third countries, the EU implements criminal procedures such as reducing or cutting aid to countries. However when the obligations are fulfilled, it applies reward method such as granting the candidate country status to the countries and starting the negotiation process. This situation can be seen in Turkey-EU relations. In the Turkey-EU relations which started on July 31, 1959, established legal basic with Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963, the EU hid itself the right to say the last word in its decisions about Turkey. This can be seen in Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement. The EU imposed the penalties for Turkey's obligations in relation to Turkey when it was fulfilled by the authorities in Turkey (giving the candidate status), and when it was not fulfilled (the suspension of the negotiation chapters). Moreover, it is stipulated that Turkey fulfills its obligations in order to become a full member of the EU. However after the military coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016, the relations between the two sides began to run down. Turkey has been reluctant to fulfill the obligations required for EU membership and the EU do anything about it. In this context, this has shown that the conditionality principle of the EU has weakened and has become non-functional.

Key Words: European Union, Turkey, Conditionality, Non-Functionality, Turkey and European Union.

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NDE KOŞULLULUK İLKESİNİN İŞLEVSİZLİĞİ: 15 TEMMUZ SONRASI TÜRKİYE-AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İLİŞKİLERİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE BİR ANALİZ

ÖZET

Kendine has bir yapıya sahip olan Avrupa Birliği, üçüncü ülkelerle olan ilişkilerinde ilginç bir yaklaşıma sahiptir. Üçüncü ülkelerle ilgili olarak son sözü söyleme hakkına sahip olan AB, takdir yetkisine sahiptir ve bu devletlerin ilişkilerini nasıl sürdüreceğine kendisi karar vermektedir. Diğer yandan AB, ilişkilerin daha iyi olması için üçüncü ülkelerden bazı yükümlülükleri yerine getirmesini istemektedir. Bu yükümlülükler üçüncü ülkeler tarafından yerine getirilmediğinde AB, ülkelere yardımların azaltılması veya kesilmesi gibi cezai usulleri uygulamaktadır. Bununla birlikte yükümlülükler yerine getirildiğinde, ülkeye aday ülke statüsü verilmesi ve müzakere sürecinin başlatılması gibi ödül yöntemi uygulanmaktadır. Bu durumu Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde görmek mümkündür. 31 Temmuz 1959'da başlayan ve 12 Eylül 1963'te Ankara Anlaşması ile hukuki zemine oturan Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde AB, Türkiye hakkındaki kararlarında son sözü söyleme hakkını saklamıştır. Bu, Ankara Anlaşması'nın 28. Maddesinde görülmektedir. AB, Türk yetkililer tarafından Türkiye'nin yapması gereken yükümlülükler

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yerine getirilmesi durumunda Türkiye'yi ödüllendirmekte (adaylık statüsü verilmesi, yükümlülükler yerine getirilmediğinde ise (müzakere başlıklarını askıya alma) cezalar vermiştir. Bununla birlikte 15 Temmuz 2016'da Türkiye'deki askeri darbe girişimi sonrasında iki taraf arasındaki ilişkiler kötüye gitmeye başlamıştır. Türkiye AB'ye tam üyelik için gerekli yükümlülükleri yerine getirme konusunda isteksiz davranmış ve AB de bu konuda herhangi bir şey yapamamıştır. Bu bağlamda, söz konusu bu durum AB'nin koşulluluk ilkesinin zayıfladığını ve işlevsiz hale geldiğini göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, Koşulluluk, İşlevsizlik, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği.

INTRODUCTION

It has undergone many changes from the years since the foundations of European integration were founded, and parallel progressive processes of deepening and enlarging have redefined integration both in terms of quality and quantity. In Parallel to the development of the EU, membership conditions have also changed as long as the responsibilities of membership increase, the obstacles in front of the new member countries have been raised. On the other hand, the elaboration of the general to expressed criteria with new instruments that have been developed every day has increased the negotiation power of the EU unilaterally by the conditionality principle (Maresceau, 2003: 11).

The conditionality was put on the agenda again at the Brussels Summit on December 15, 2006. It was also agreed that the "Enlargement Strategy Document" should be prepared on the impact of the enlargement process, including Turkey, Croatia, and the Balkan countries. In the "Enlargement Strategy Document" it is stated that it will not be expanded without harmonization with the institutional structure of the Group, taking permanent protection measures so as not to adversely affect the Community, the possibility of long transition periods and the possible effects on the enlargement of the Community budget. In this context, the enlargement process will be done according to 3C (consolidation, conditionally and communication) policy (European Commission, 2006: 3-5). From these policies, according to the consolidation policy, it is understood that the Community will be coextensive with the enlargement of the integration so as not to damage the future expansions. That is, candidate countries will expect the community to prepare themselves, even if all conditions are met for full membership. The conditionality policy is intended to fully enforce the rules for all candidate countries from now on. The communication policy is intended to strengthen communication between the governments and peoples of the Community member states (Preston, 1997: 43).

Actually, the most important gain that allows candidate countries to adhere to the reform process is, of course, the long-term promise of membership of the EU. In recent years, the attitudes of some EU members, particularly France and Germany, to the situation of Turkey have allowed a different outcome, except membership, at the end of the accession period. This situation, also causes Turkey to slow down its reform process along with reducing the credibility of the EU conditionality. Moreover, the recent worsening relations between the two parts after the events of the last period, causing the conditionality principle to become non-functional (Grabbe, 2002: 250).

In this context, this study will examine whether the conditionality principle works in the context of Turkey-EU relations after the coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, will evaluate why the process is this way.

CONDITIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Conditionality first emerged as a concept used by international credit and aid agencies. Conditionality as a concept is used to express the whole of the requirements arising in relation to lending (Zormelo, 1997: 7). The principle of conditionality in the European Union includes the conditions that the candidate countries are expected to fulfill before becoming a member. At the same time, this principle emerges as an important mechanism of action for candidate countries to develop sound and applicable policies. The main objective of the conditionality principle in terms of the EU is to prepare the candidate countries for membership and to be guided accordingly in the process so that they become a part of the EU system when they become members (Mayhew, 1998: 162). Membership conditions have contributed to the greater role of the EU in the international role and the strengthening of this role. However, such conditions have delayed the membership of the candidate countries and led to the EU's control of the enlargement process, especially in the context of the differentiation principle. The conditionality principle, which first appeared in the Birkelbach Report prepared by the European Parliament in 1962, became even more important after the conditions of the membership application were later reorganized in the Rome Treaty (European Parliament, 2017). For example, according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, a state must be in Europe to become a member of the European Union. (European Commission, 2017).

The conditionality principle of the EU emerged in the post-Cold War era in the process of accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU. Especially at the beginning of the 1990's, new democratic structures began to emerge in Central and Eastern European countries. For example, the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 opened the new way for enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern European Countries and supported the Commission's position on membership conditions (European Parliament, 1993: 1-22). Member States that do not wish to take the risk of deepening, declared that Central and Eastern European Countries which have a partnership agreement can become members of the Union on condition that they meet certain requirements referred to as the Copenhagen Criteria. However, it has been added to the statement which is important for the interests of both the EU and the candidate countries, without destroying the deepening process of EU and damaging the Community's absorption capacity to new members (Smith, 2004: 255). Thus, the EU has not only revealed the conditions for membership but has also shown that it will be under its control. The EU conditionality principle aims to harmonize with the EU standards in the process of nomination of Central and Eastern European countries and the Copenhagen Criteria was adopted at the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, and forced to countries to make changes in various laws and implementing methods.

During the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria, the "Pre-Accession Strategy" was adopted at the Essen Summit in December 1994 and the EU tried to

present a clearer and concrete guide to the candidate countries. It was followed by the Accession Partnership Document, which is one of the most important elements of the pre-accession strategy officially announced at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit (Weber, 1995: 200). The main objective of the Accession Partnership is to set priorities for each candidate country and to collect EU aid under one roof. It has received a list of priorities to be fulfilled by the candidate countries in the framework of the Accession Partnership Document and the European Commission's assessments (Maniokas, 2000: 49-51).

Over time, EU conditionality has gained significant importance in reducing the disparities in the developmental level of Western European and Central and Eastern European countries and establishing a balance between the countries under EU control. The EU has used the conditionality principle as a mechanism of action in order to ensure change in the candidate countries and to harmonize them with their own principles and standards and regards conditionality as a strategic instrument. This has made the role of the EU in the process of change in these countries even more prominent (Smith, 2003: 106).

The EU performed the principle of conditionality with its own rules and standards, through the "carrot" and "stick" approach and various impact mechanisms, and the candidate countries are involved in the harmonization process (Taylor, 1996: 104). Among the major awards which have been offered by EU is technical and financial support. But the biggest prize is known as full membership. On the other hand, if the candidate country does not fulfill the expectation in the context of EU conditionality, these aid and institutional bonds are suspended and the candidate countries are punished (Perez, 2015: 34).

At this point, it is expected that the candidate country will act on the cost-benefit analysis. If the candidate country believes that membership benefits and benefits such as socio-economic development, democratization, foreign capital inflows, fund transfer, security and international legitimacy are more than costs such as loss of sovereignty and high costs of reforms in certain sectors, it is foreseen that this change and reform process will continue as part of EU alignment and full membership (Sedelmeier, 1994: 35).

IMPAIRMENT OF CONDITIONALITY PRINCIPLE: 15 JULY MILITARY COUP ATTEMPT AND TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

On 15 July 2016, after a coup attempt to be carried out by a group of soldiers linked to the FETO, millions of people were thrown into the streets and united against the coup (Ataman, 2017: 11). Approximately 250 people lost their lives and more than 2,000 people were injured in those who resisted the coup attempt (Dalay, 2016). The first reaction to the coup attempt was from outside Russia and Turkey did not see the support that had expected from the Western countries. According to some authorities in Turkey, the EU made statements about the failure of the coup attempt. This situation has caused problems with the EU and Turkey relations (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016a). Therefore, Turkey is approaching the EU with prejudice, and some problems have begun to arise between the two sides (Ulgen, 2004: 12).

Donald Tusk, chairman of the EU Council of Ministers, said that the EU fully supports the ruling, democratic institutions and the rule of law that have come to power with democratic elections, but Turkey has said that constitutional assembly should be implemented as soon as possible. Tusk said that Turkey could not solve the existing problems with arms and stressed that the measures taken should not violate democracy and the rule of law (European Commission, 2016a). Similarly, the European Commission has announced that it supports democratic institutions as well as condemning the coup attempt (European Commission, 2016b).

At the same time, the debate over the imposition of the death punishment in Turkey has begun, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that he will approve the decision after Parliament has reinstated his death penalty (Cagaptay and Jeffrey, 2016). EU officials, on the other hand, stressed that the relations and membership negotiations would be seriously damaged. For example, European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker explained that if the death penalty comes back in Turkey, the EU membership process will cease. On top of that, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that the EU's statements on the death penalty are unnecessary. Cavusoglu, stating that Turkey has been working hard to become a member of the EU for many years, has now said that two-thirds of the people want to end their negotiations with the EU (Euractiv, 2016a). In other words, Turkey has not been supported by the West as expected and started to think about alternatives. On 16 July 2016, Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for the Foreign Policy and Security and Vice-President of the European Commission, and EU Commissioner for EU Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn made a statement. In this declaration, The European Union has condemned the coup attempt in Turkey and the European Union stated that supported to democratic institutions in Turkey. (Lecha, 2016: 1-3). Mogherini and Hahn, who said that societal tension will be solved by democratic processes, said that Turkey should respect the constitutional order and the EU values (Kirisci and Laub, 2016; European Parliament, 2016a).

Presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin stated that Turkey has its strong support expected from Western countries but would not meet the expectations of Western countries condemned the coup attempt. Moreover, the EU has warned Turkey to pass to the existing democratic order as soon as possible. (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016a).

While Turkey-EU relations begin to slow down on 18 July 2016, it was discussed developments in Turkey at the meeting in the EU Foreign Affairs Council. On 15 July 2016, the coup attempt was condemned and the legitimate institutions of the country were supported. Nevertheless, the EU appreciated the steps taken by the political parties in Turkey towards democracy (Bard, Carrera, Guild and Kochenov, 2016: 17). After all EU stressed that disproportionate use of force by the security forces in Turkey has need to pay attention to matters. At the meeting, it was stated that Turkey was a key country for the EU, and that the abolishing of the death punishment was a condition for membership, and that the EU would like to work with a democratic and stable Turkey. (Foreign Affairs Council, 2016).

On the other hand, the EU invited Turkey to return to the constitutional assembly as soon as possible due to its State of Emergency situations and to respect the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms (Idiz, 2016). The EU, stating that the rule of law and the respect of democracy must be guaranteed, stressed that these values are key to the EU. The Turkey's rapporteur of the Dutch EP, Kati Piri, is aware of the fact that some precautions are taken after the events, but the events in Turkey are worrying. Piri, on the other hand, noted that these developments are an important democracy examination in Turkey (European Parliament, 2016b). In the face of all this, the Ankara government has announced that Turkey and the EU will suspend the Readmission Agreement in the event that visas do not rise until October, in accordance with the *pacta sunt servanda* principle. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu have expressed in many places that they will not accept acceptance if there is no visa exemption and they expect a definite date from the EU on visa liberalization (Vincenti, 2016). Moreover, it has begun discussions about the EU in Turkey and alternatives are discussed. Turkey has been applying for formal membership in 2011 and has obtained the status of a dialogue partner in 2013. From this moment on, President Erdogan has expressed that he may withdraw his application for full membership to the EU in view of his acceptance as a member of the Organization many times.

If Turkey terminate their relationship with the European Union Turkey's separation of its roads with the EU could cause an economically significant damage. Politically, democracy, the rule of law, there have been significant developments in the field of human rights in Turkey. After the EU candidate Turkey has made important reforms for harmonization with the EU *acquis*. These reforms have led to serious developments in the democratization of the country. The fight of the Turkish people against the coup d'état on July 15th became an important indicator of this situation. This is not enough for Turkey (Eur-Lex, 2017).

However Turkey also wants to take part in the EU decision-making mechanism. But this requirement is to become a full member of the EU. For full membership, the criteria set by the EU must be met. Considering the current EU structure, it seems difficult for Turkey to become a member of the EU. On the other hand, ending relations with the EU could lead to the disappearance of economic and political gains so far. For example, TUSIAD Brussels Representative Bahadır Kalegasi stated that the economic, political and social development of Turkey depends on the EU accession process. Saying that the statue of being a prospective member to the EU provides a strong position in Turkey in the eyes of the whole world, Kalegasi said that even if it is not a member of the EU, it will provide EU standards and strengthen the national interest of a Turkey which is Europe's gateway to Eurasia (Poyrazlar, 2016). For this reason, an aggressive foreign policy push that can be made with a momentary resentment will allow Turkey to spot bullets while diminishing rice.

But new developments have caused tensions between EU and Turkey. For example in October 2016, however, Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, found the operation of the Republican Newspaper on October 31, 2016, and the decree of the Law to shut down 15 Kurdish media. Jagland, stating that the European Convention on Human Rights also applies in the period of emergency,

warns Turkey about democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms (International Federation of Journalists, 2016). The former EP President Martin Schulz (The new EP President is Antonio Tajani from Italy) also said he saw the operation in Cumhuriyet Newspaper as a violation of freedom of expression (Butler and Pamuk, 2016). Likewise, Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, find that the restrictions imposed on the education system, the judiciary and the media in Turkey are unacceptable. However, Mogherini and Hahn have been alarmed by the arrest of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality President Gülten Kışanak and Co-President Fırat Anlı who have been elected democratically and have warned Turkey about democracy, rule of law, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms (BBC, 2016).

However, On November 9, 2016, the European Commission published Turkey's Progress Report. It was stated that Turkey is a key country for the EU and decided to deepen the common areas on November 29, 2015, by the two in this report. The report, condemning the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, stated that the EU supports democratic institutions in the country. Due to the measures were taken after the coup attempt, the EU urged Turkey to maintain its supremacy and fundamental rights at the highest level. The report states that Turkey acts arbitrarily in practices and measures after the coup attempt, that the judicial independence has been overturned, that the practices in the state of emergency are very heavy and contrary to democracy, the EU is concerned. In this report, it is stated that 16 chapters have been opened and one of them has been temporarily closed and the work has been continued for chapters 15, 26, 31 and 23 between Turkey and EU. At the same time it is emphasized that acceleration of negotiations is depended on Turkey's fulfillment of its obligations under the Negotiating Framework Document (European Commission, 2016c: 4).

On the other hand, according to the report, Turkey and the EU have entered into intensive cooperation on combating terrorism and foreign and security politics. The two sides that have cooperated on immigration and they are making their way from their hands in not allowing illegal immigration. The effort Turkey has shown to provide shelter in this and more than three millions refugees have been appreciated. The EU, which stressed that the seventy two criteria for visa liberalization have not yet been completed, said that visa liberalization could be achieved if the criteria were fulfilled. However, according to the report, the EU has allocated 6 billion euros of funds to the refugees in Turkey (Penev, 2016). Nevertheless, it was noted that Turkey declared a state of emergency after the July 15 coup attempt, and significant changes were made to the state of emergency. On top of that, the EU invited Turkey to comply with its rule of law, democracy and human rights. Moreover, it stated that these measures were examined by the EU Council of Ministers (European Commission, 2016c: 5).

In the meantime, Turkey has not taken the EU's warnings into account and has continued to take tough measures. Upon this on 24 November 2016, however, a meeting was held in the EP General Assembly on the grounds that Turkey did not comply with the EU values stipulated in the statements of EU officials and in the Progress Report and continued to take tough measures. According to the European Parliament, which condemned the unsuccessful coup attempt, the Turkish government found disproportionate measures under the state of emergency. According to the parliament, a

large number of arrests, exports from the job is the issue. On the other hand, there are debates about the re-imposition of the death penalty in Turkey. All this is contrary to European values. For this reason, the recommendation of Parliament, including the temporary suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey, was adopted with 479 yes, 37 refusal and 107 abstentions. In the decision, Turkey was told that it had to strictly adhere to the EU, and in this advisory decision, it was pledged that the process would be reviewed again at the end of the applications under the emergency situation (European Parliament, 2016b). President Erdogan said that Turkey did not end its relations with the EU in the face of this decision and that Turkey will seek alternatives after negotiations are stopped (EU Observer, 2016a).

After the European Parliament's recommendation on November 24, 2016, after 1 December 2016, Dutch diplomats say that Germany, the European Commission and many other countries should continue their membership negotiations with Turkey, but do not intensify efforts to stop membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Dutch diplomats, concerned about the support of radical groups in their countries and in the EU who have negative opinions about anti-immigration and Islam, argued that it would be better for the EU to stop negotiations with Turkey because of the fear (Euractiv, 2016b).

Despite all, EU has not accepted as a suspension decision and has tried to be continued to the process. For example, on November 28, 2016, the EP International Trade Committee held a meeting to update the Customs Union and expand its scope. The main elements that emerged at this meeting were the following.

- The economic integration of Turkey with the EU needs to be deepened in order to consolidate EU and Turkey-EU common utility areas that expand the domain.
- Since 1996, when the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU entered into force, there have been positive developments not only in commercial areas but also in many other areas. The multi-dimensional structure of the Customs Union has been the driving force of the EU-Turkey integration process.
- The customs union needs to be updated and harmonized in order to address existing problems in the functioning of the Customs Union and to make commercial relations compatible with current conditions.
- An update on the free circulation of agriculture, public procurement and services will lead to a win-win opportunity in Turkey-EU relations.
- An agreement is under the heading of sustainable development and environmental protection between the two sides.
- The removal of other barriers as well as customs duties on the free movement of agriculture and services is very important for the maximum benefit (European Commission, 2016d: 1-14).

Members of the EP and the EU-Turkey Customs Union Rapporteur David Borelli said that the drafting of the European Commission's Customs Union update will be carried out by the EU Council of Ministers until the end of December 2016, saying that the realization of these elements will lead to significant steps in the trade and integration process between Turkey and the EU. (European Commission, 2016d: 1-14).

However, Austria has supported the decision to freeze membership negotiations with Turkey in the light of these developments against European Union values in Turkey. Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz has announced that he will veto decisions in the EU if this decision is not implemented. States such as Germany and France have pointed out the strategic importance of Turkey and maintained that negotiations should continue with Turkey. European Commission President Juncker also said that Turkey should survive this tough period and that the EU should establish closer ties with Turkey instead of freezing the relations (Vytiska, 2016).

At the EU Foreign Ministers' meeting on 13 December 2016, the European Parliament and Austria's decisions about stopping negotiations with Turkey were rejected. At the meeting, which stated that close relations with Turkey should be established, the decision to freeze membership negotiations was also rejected while it was decided not to open a new negotiation heading with Turkey. Then Austria vetoed the meeting result document (Nielsen, 2016).

On April 16, 2017, 51.4% of the people said "Yes" in the public vote for the constitutional amendment in Turkey. German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the outcome of the referendum on the continuation of the relations between Turkey and the EU should be expected. The Dutch authorities, which prevented the Netherlands from making a refund campaign for safety reasons, were accused by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of using Nazi methods (Gotev, 2017). After the people in the referendum said yes, tensions started to happen in some countries like the Netherlands. Debates on death punishment in Turkey debates about the possibility of the referendum on relations with the EU, tensions between the parties have improved (Euractiv, 2017).

An official statement on behalf of the EU regarding the referendum in Turkey came from European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, High Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission Federica Mogherini and Commission Member Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Member Johannes Hahn. Hahn stated that Turkey-EU relations are not sustainable at the current level and should be carried out within the framework of economic relations and gave the message that there is no more place to go in negotiations and that the parties should focus on the practical side of bilateral relations and the updating of the Turkey- EU Customs Union in the upcoming period (Euractiv, 2017).

After a concrete development of the negotiation process and the full membership process could not be achieved, it was requested to focus on the updating of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU and it is stated that negotiations will start in 2017 (Pierini, 2017). Because European authorities have stated that a new chapter will not be opened as long as the current political situation continues in Turkey. On the other hand, these authorities offered that negotiations with Turkey should be stopped. Upon this Ömer Çelik who is the Minister of European Union and Chief Negotiator indicated that European authorities' discourses are unserious. That is, the discourse of the EU has not had an impact on Turkey.

CONCLUSION

Turkey-EU relations have included both positive and negative processes in the historical process. These negative processes have been arranged in the direction of EU directives, sometimes using sticks or carrots. The obligation to fulfill the necessary conditions for Turkey to be member to the EU and the dependence on the EU in return turned the process favorably to the EU.

But, in the context of recent developments, Turkey has developed a more aggressive foreign policy in relation to the EU. This situation is also due to the economic and political strengthening of Turkey and the development of a stable atmosphere in the country. Especially after the coup attempt on July 15th, he had a serious loss of trust to the EU. After this, Turkey, which went on to reassess its relations with the EU, did nothing that the EU wanted Turkey to do, and even the authorities gave harsh words to the EU. Besides, the EU has said that the EU accession process will be difficult if the mentioned requests are not fulfilled. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has adopted a recommendation on the suspension of negotiations with Turkey. On these decisions, Turkey has not stepped back and said that the EU should not interfere with Turkey's business.

From this point of view, the EU has lost its stick to relations with Turkey, in other words punishment. This condition has several causes. The EU, which has not been exposed to the effects of the global economic crisis and faces a new negative situation every day, has begun to lose its importance or fascination for Turkey. On the other hand, the reluctance of the Turkish public to join the EU led the government to adopt an appropriate foreign policy. Besides, Turkey has been trying for full membership to the EU for many years and it has been thought that Turkey's membership to the EU has shaken Turkey's confidence in the EU and that it is a double standard against Turkey.

Turkey, which does not accept this situation anymore, has started to look for new alternatives, particularly against the EU's threats, especially after the recent events. The increasing power and capacity of Turkey in the international conjuncture, and the confidence and trust of the people in domestic politics, have made it a more aggressive policy towards the EU. This has led the EU to refrain from punishment for Turkey. In this sense, the principle of conditionality that the EU activates with the approach of carrot and stick has become dysfunctional against Turkey after the recent events.

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