NON-FUNCTIONALITY OF THE CONDITIONALY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU: ANALYSIS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TURKEYEUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS AFTER JULY 15 JULY

Abstract

Having a unique structure, the European Union has an interesting approach to its relations with third countries. The EU, which holds the right to say the final word in relation to the third countries, has its own right to appreciate, and it decides itself how such states will continue their relationsOn the other hand, the EU wants to fulfill some obligations from third countries in order for relations to be better. When these obligations are not fulfilled by third countries, the EU implements criminal procedures such as reducing or cutting aid to countries. However when the obligations are fulfilled, it applies reward method such as granting the candidate country status to the countries and starting the negotiation process. This situation can be seen in Turkey-EU relations. In the Turkey-EU relations which started on July 31, 1959, established legal basic with Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963, the EU hid itself the right to say the last word in its decisions about Turkey. This can be seen in Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement. The EU imposed the penalties for Turkey's obligations in relation to Turkey when it was fulfilled by the authorities in Turkey (giving the candidate status), and when it was not fulfilled (the suspension of the negotiation chapters). Moreover, it is stipulated that Turkey fulfills its obligations in order to become a full member of the EU. However after the military coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016, the relations between the two sides began to run down. Turkey has been reluctant to fulfill the obligations required for EU membership and the EU do anything about it. In this context, this has shown that the conditionality principle of the EU has weakened and has become non-functional.