REFORM AND INTEREST: THE PROJECT OF THE BASIC LAW ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN TURKEY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

Abstract

Prepared in 2003, dubbed ―The Basic Law of Public Administration‖ and aimed at a full-fledged and fundamental reform in the Turkish public administration, the Turkish public administration reform project met with the opposition of various social groups, which brought about its failure to be passed into law. The opposition this reform project faced is a phenomenon that is fitting to be examined from the perspective of public choice theory which argues that political behaviors can be best understood as attempts to seek interest. The main objective of this article is to analyze the reform process in question from the perspective of public choice theory. When this theory falls short of exploring the source of this motivation, Heper‘s conceptualization of transcendental state – instrumental state was employed. In conclusion, this article suggests that the major reason for the failure of this reform project is the fact that the rents that were being distributed by the traditional Turkish administration were forcefully protected by those who have been receiving them. The study ends with several lessons drawn and suggestions as to how to do public administration reform.